Interview : Joseph Gyourko by Aaron Steelman
Editor’s Note: This is an abbreviated version of RF’s conver-
sation with Joseph Gyourko. For the full interview, go to our Web
site: www.richmondfed.org/publications.
The boom and subsequent decline of the U.S. housing 
market has many economists and the general public ask-
ing: What happened? Joseph Gyourko, a professor of
real estate at the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton
School of Business, has spent a lot of time examining
that issue. In part, he says, the run-up was caused by
irrational, speculative behavior by private lenders and
borrowers. But there were other causes, too, such as
land-use regulation that limited building in some cities
and thus drove up prices. Gyourko argues that in areas
where it is relatively easy to build, the correction will
likely persist until prices are again driven by fundamen-
tals — meaning, by production costs. In those areas
where regulation has effectively capped the supply of
housing, such as New York City, prices will be deter-
mined almost solely by demand, which has fallen
recently as numerous Wall Street firms have encoun-
tered troubles.
Gyourko also has looked at the problems Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac have experienced. He argues that the
implicit subsidy those companies received came with a
costly catch — to provide risky loans to marginal appli-
cants in the name of “affordable housing.” While the
provision of affordable housing may be a laudable policy
goal, it should be done transparently, with the budget-
ary costs clear to everyone. Ultimately, Gyourko argues,
Fannie and Freddie should be shrunk and privatized.
As an urban economist, Gyourko has studied 
what drives economic growth and vitality. In today’s
economic environment the most important factor is
human capital. Cities with innovative, high-skilled work
forces will continue to thrive while many of the giant
industrial cities will face a steady, if slow, decline. 
Gyourko joined the Wharton faculty in 1984, after
earning his Ph.D. that same year at the University of
Chicago. He has served as co-editor of Real Estate
Economics, been a visiting scholar at the Philadelphia
Fed and a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings
Institution, and since 2006 been a research associate
with the National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER). He currently is director of Wharton’s
Zell/Lurie Real Estate Center and co-author with
Edward Glaeser of the recently published Rethinking
Federal Housing Policy: How to Make Housing Plentiful
and Affordable. Aaron Steelman interviewed Gyourko at
his office at Penn on Sept. 25, 2008.
RF: Is the expansion of homeownership, in your view, a
desirable public-policy goal?
Gyourko: I think there are benefits to homeownership.
That said, expanding it the way we have done is clearly not
worth enduring systemic risk. So, given how we did it and
what we got, the answer is no.
This is how I think we should consider the issue: When
you become an equity owner, you have a stake in your com-
munity. You have a stronger incentive to make the
community better than if you were transient. That is the
standard economic argument in favor of potentially subsi-
dizing homeownership. But there is no evidence in the
literature that relies on truly experimental or exogenous
variation which shows there is any benefit. We all believe
there is but it is very hard to find. You can identify correla-
tions of being a homeowner and better outcomes for
children, of being a homeowner and being more public-
spirited in terms of becoming informed about public issues.
But it’s hard to show causality. Yes, I think economists
believe there are positive externalities to being a home-
owner. But there is no way that those positive externalities





























Ijustify the extent we have inter-
vened in the market through the
huge subsidies that have gone to
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and
created systemic risk.
RF:  What do you think of the
home mortgage interest deduction?
Gyourko: It’s a political sacred cow. But I don’t think it has
done much good and I am not in favor of it. Ed Glaeser has
done some work that shows its effect on the homeowner-
ship rate is very small. Consider my own case. My decision to
buy a house is not affected at all by the home mortgage 
interest deduction. I have two children who go to public
schools in a nice area. And to go to those public schools, you
have to own a home because there is not much rental stock.
So that’s a big reason why I am a homeowner, not because I
can deduct the mortgage interest.
What the policy does affect, though, is the type of homes
people own. I probably own a bigger home than I would 
otherwise. But it’s not at all clear to me why you would want
to subsidize middle- and upper-income households. I don’t
think it is affecting the homeownership rate much and it is a
subsidy to the relatively better off.
RF: How much, if at all, does homeownership con-
tribute to frictions in the labor market — that is,
lessening mobility for new and perhaps more suitable
employment options?
Gyourko: We are a little unclear on sharp estimates. But Ed
Glaeser and I did some work in 2005 which shows that
cheap housing in general is really attractive to the poor in
declining areas. The argument goes as follows: If you are a
low-skilled worker, your wage is pretty much the same in
Detroit as it is in, say, Charlotte. However, prices in declin-
ing areas like Detroit can fall dramatically below
construction costs but not in Charlotte. So you might 
actually be relatively better off in Detroit, even though 
your employment opportunities are less, because you can
consume a lot of great housing at a cheap price. 
More broadly, some work I recently did that is now out in
the NBER Working Papers series shows that if you go 
negative in terms of your home equity, your two-year 
mobility rate falls by half. Why? Mainly, I think, because
those people are capital constrained. Also, I think there is
some loss aversion that is going on. But it’s clear that there
are large mobility effects if you have negative equity in your
home. I think they are much smaller if you do not have 
negative equity. 
We do know that there are big differences in mobility
between renters and owners. But, again, that is not necessar-
ily causal. I am an owner and I am much less mobile than my
research assistant who is a renter. But that’s because he is
young and doesn’t have kids, whereas I want to stay in the
same place. I don’t want to move
my kids out of school. People 
who want to stay in one place do
tend to own a home, but it’s not
necessarily the home that locks
them in.
RF: I have read that the nonprime mortgage market
reached nearly 40 percent in recent years. What do you
think is a more stable long-run figure? 
Gyourko: Actually, the nonprime market reached 50 per-
cent in 2006. That includes subprime, Alt-A, home equity,
and FHA/VA. The sum of those four reached 50 percent of
mortgage volume issued in 2006. In a typical year, it would
range somewhere between 10 percent and 20 percent. 
It skyrocketed. I think the 10 percent to 20 percent range is
more normal. 
RF: What do you think caused that increase?
Gyourko: There were a couple of factors. First, a long 
period of rising prices led both borrowers and lenders to
believe that, with relatively little risk, you could have very
high leverage and very low rates. That, combined with the
very large fees that these loans generated, led to an increase
in market share. Second, I believe the government strongly
encouraged it. Fannie and Freddie provided important 
liquidity for this market. 
Why did they do that? I doubt that it was because they
thought it was in their shareholders’ interests. They proba-
bly thought these were risky loans. They had Congress
telling them that their implicit subsidy comes with this man-
date to provide affordable housing, and this was one of the
ways that they did it. Our political system very much
encouraged them to provide liquidity and extend these risky
loans to very marginal buyers. 
RF:   What would you view as a desirable endpoint, from
a policy perspective, with regard to Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac?
Gyourko: I would like to see them shrunk, privatized, and
spun off. That means the affordable housing component of
their reason for being has to be taken over by somebody else,
because I don’t think we should do away with all affordable
housing programs. 
But I do think those programs ought to be brought on-
budget and placed in the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development or a similar entity and made an explicit
cost to the government. The way to get these programs 
managed properly is to have them truly transparent, and
then we can decide which ones we think are worth it and
which ones are not. I think the reason these programs got so
big was that they were off-budget, and politicians could
nudge Fannie and Freddie management because there was
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Supply-side restrictions are a
big reason why housing prices
are so high in some markets.
 no cost in terms of actual budgetary expenditures, even
though there was obviously a very large cost in terms of risk. 
RF: Could you discuss your work with Ed Glaeser on
land-use regulation and the price of real estate in urban
areas?
Gyourko: Glaeser took a leave from Harvard and visited
Penn for a year. We started talking and one of the things we
noted was that the dispersion in house prices across markets
is going way up over time. However, the high land price areas
are relatively few and they are almost all on the coasts of the
United States. The question is: Why is that the case? One
answer would be, if you only believe in horizontal develop-
ment, you have an ocean as a natural barrier to growth. But
you can also build up, and New York was the classic case. 
Another reason might be income. The reason prices are
higher in New York, Boston, San Francisco, and Los Angeles
is that incomes are higher. And then you get another boost
for San Francisco and Los Angeles because the climates are
great. People are willing to pay for that. 
But supply is an important factor. It became clear that
unless you have differences in supply, you could not explain
why prices were very high in those markets. There has been
very little new construction. And the reason why is that
there have been restraints on growth. Developers would like
to build but they can’t because of regulation. We have now
convinced ourselves, and I hope others, that supply-side
restrictions play a big role in how those markets have
changed and are a big reason why their prices are so high.
The existing residents of those areas have been very 
successful at limiting growth.
RF: Why would you see such behavior among residents
in only a select group of cities, though?
Gyourko: We don’t know. As economists, our first thought
is that the people of New York and San Francisco are just
protecting capital gains. But let’s assume that the people of
Richmond and Atlanta are not stupid, and obviously they are
not. They could figure this out, too, and place restrictions on
growth. But they haven’t. Clearly there is something else
going on. It could be social. It’s a huge research question. 
RF: Do you see the trend of tremendous growth in
house prices on the coasts continuing?
Gyourko: In the long run, that trend will continue. But in
the short run, they are going to fall. New York’s housing 
supply is inelastic so the prices are determined by 
demand. When Wall Street is booming, housing prices are
going to rise. When it is having trouble, like now, housing
prices are going to fall, I think substantially. But in the long
run — let’s say 10 years or more — prices are going to con-
tinue to rise. They are attractive places to live — they have a
lot of amenities — and they have high human capital. 
So as long as people want to live there and they are funda-
mentally productive, prices will go up in the long run if you 
restrict supply. 
RF: Have you looked at Houston? If so, how has its 
regulatory policies (or lack thereof) affected develop-
ment compared to other Sun Belt cities?
Gyourko: In terms of growth, there’s not much difference.
Atlanta, Dallas, and Houston have all grown well above the
national average in terms of population expansion. And if
you are growing in population, it means you are building
homes. The correlation between the change in population
and the change in housing units is almost one. So they are all
growing at fairly similar rates. 
What differentiates Houston is that it is more of a
hodgepodge, because it is unique in its relative lack of zon-
ing policies. So you get one type of development right next
to a completely different type. Personally, I don’t like that. I
think there actually are negative externalities to that type of
growth. 
While Glaeser and I have argued that the social costs of
development congestion are not nearly as high as the price
increases associated with excessive limitations, 
I am not a believer in no zoning and no regulation. There
really are some social costs, and I think Houston probably
goes too far. It doesn’t internalize some of those costs. You
should think about traffic flows. You should think about pol-
lution spillovers. It is reasonable to try to internalize the
costs of those things. It is quite legitimate for government to
congregate certain types of activities in select areas. That’s a
far step from, say, having huge minimum lot size require-
ments, so that only the super rich could live in an area. 
In short, I think cities are better off with some 
regulation, much less than New York, but probably more
than Houston.
RF: Some people have argued that the housing markets
in cities like Buffalo, Cleveland, and Detroit are ripe for
a rebound as jobs become more mobile, due to telecom-
muting, and people look for more affordable housing.
Do you think there is some truth to those arguments or
do you think they tend to be too optimistic?
Gyourko:  I think it is highly unlikely that we will see a
rebound in those cities’ housing markets. Again, what 
drives modern growth in the modern era — ever since man-
ufacturing deurbanized — is skills. You need high-skilled
people, and there is no reason for those people to go to
Buffalo. They can go to Charlotte, Atlanta, or Dallas, 
where the climates are better and there tend to be more
amenities. 
Now, is it possible that one of those slumping cities will
have the next Bill Gates in it, just by serendipity, and that he
sprouts a huge new industry there? Yes, it’s possible. But it
would require a lot of luck.
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RF: You have talked a lot about how people value ameni-
ties when choosing a place to live. Older industrial cities
tend to still have good medical facilities, nice museums,
and world-class orchestras, all of which arose during
their industrial heydays. Why aren’t those attractive to
residents?
Gyourko:They are important. Those things help to explain
why urban decline is so long and so slow. This wealth that
they accumulated when they were great industrial towns is
very durable. It has thrown off things that have lasted a long,
long time. The Cleveland Clinic is still with us, it is still one
of the great medical centers in the world, and that’s not
going to go away. But the rest of the place will slowly decline
because very little of our economy is tied to having cheap
water access, which means that the business value of being
on the Great Lakes has declined sharply. 
RF: Many cities have helped fund sports stadiums, with
public officials arguing that such facilities will improve
the business and residential climates in such areas. 
For instance, this argument was used in Washington,
D.C., when the new baseball stadium was built in
Anacostia. Is there much evidence to support such
claims?
Gyourko: The bulk of the evidence is that, in a purely fiscal
sense, these things don’t work. The numbers don’t add up. So
to justify them, you have to make different arguments.
When Ed Rendell, the former mayor of Philadelphia and
now the governor of Pennsylvania, argued in support of sub-
sidies for stadiums for the Phillies and the Eagles he said
that there are valuable social spillovers. There’s a feeling of
community that is generated by having nice stadiums where
fans can go and have a good time. I think that is the only
argument that is plausible. 
I personally don’t like these subsidies. Consider the
Eagles. The National Football League operates a type of
monopoly. There is not free entry. So when you subsidize 
stadiums, you are providing a subsidy to players and 
management. I see no reason why the median taxpayer in
this town should subsidize Jeffrey Lurie, the owner, or 
multimillion dollar players. I didn’t favor such subsidies. 
I don’t favor them. And I have never seen any hard, good 
evidence, which is replicable, that shows they are positive in
a fiscal sense. 
Rendell made a noneconomic argument. I don’t think it’s
a compelling argument. But it is a far stronger argument
than claiming that there will be a net revenue gain by subsi-
dizing stadium construction. One of the reasons that the
economic argument is weak is that people have a relatively
fixed budget for leisure. People who don’t go to the football
stadium and spend money there are likely to spend those
funds elsewhere, say, at the movies. But they are not likely to
spend money both at the game and at the movies. They are
choosing between available options.
RF: But what if the city council decides that it wants to
revitalize a certain part of the city and that building a
stadium would help do that?
Gyourko: Yes, that has been a justification for some 
stadium subsidies. But when people say that they want to
improve an area, I suspect that what they really want to do
as a society is to help the people living in that area. A much
cheaper and more efficient way to do that is to directly give
them money. So when you think about the subsidy for the
Washington Nationals’ new ballpark in Anacostia, think
about the money that was spent on that. Then take that
same sum, divide it by the number of poor people living
around the stadium, and that’s the size of the check you
could have given them. If you really want to help them, that’s
the way to do it.
RF: How accurately do households factor in commuting
costs when purchasing houses in the suburbs or exurbs?
Gyourko: I haven’t seen economists address that question.
But I think people understand quite well what the trade-offs
are. And, increasingly, people who work in the downtown
core do not live in the exurbs. Remember, the reason you
have exurbs is that businesses follow people out there. So
those people’s commuting costs are often much lower than
you might think.
I will give you an example: the Philadelphia metro area.
The largest office node is not downtown Philadelphia. It’s
the King of Prussia office node northwest of the city. It has
10 million more square feet of office space than downtown
Philadelphia. People live around there and have pretty short
commutes. So employment has suburbanized and that’s why
commuting times are not as severe as a lot of people believe. 
I think people understand how much they are going to
have to drive. The real question is: Do we pay too little for
gasoline? The answer is almost certainly yes, at least until
recently. The true social cost of driving was higher than the
price we were paying at the pump.
RF: What do you think of “Best Places to Live” studies?
Gyourko: I am not a big fan of the popular ones because
they don’t do it through revealed choice. Quality of life
should be measured by how much you are willing to pay to
live in an area. Instead, a lot of these indices put places near
the top of the list with cheap housing. As an economist, 
I know that housing must be expensive somewhere because
it is really attractive or really productive. High prices signal
high quality of life, not low prices. The classic urban spatial
equilibrium models say that housing prices are the fees you
pay to access the amenities and productivities of an area. 
I built some indices in the early 1990s based on that 
assumption. I think most of the business community gets
this backward, because they like low prices, not unsurpris-
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attractive. Do you really think the
quality of life is higher there? My
argument would be no, because 
people are not willing to bid up 
the price.
RF: You have a recent working
paper titled, “Do Political Parties
Matter? Evidence from U.S.
Cities.” Can you talk about that a
little?
Gyourko: That paper is forthcom-
ing in the Quarterly Journal of
Economics. There is a big political
economy literature out there which
says that at the federal and state lev-
els, political parties matter. That is,
partisanship is important because
the policy outcomes are quite differ-
ent if, say, the Republicans are in control rather than the
Democrats. My colleague Fernando Ferreira and I thought
that this probably isn’t true at the local level. We suspected
that the reason is that there is much more competition at
the local government level. For instance, if I don’t like 
policy at the federal level, what am I going to do? I could
move to Canada. But that’s very costly. It’s also usually 
costly to move to another state. But if I don’t like the poli-
cies of my hometown of Swarthmore, it’s pretty cheap to go
next door. So we thought that competition would restrain
partisanship. 
We spent a couple of years collecting data on mayoral
elections: which party won and by how much. In this paper,
we looked at close elections and compared local fiscal policy
outcomes — how big was the government, what they spent
their money on, things like that. The reason we relied on
close elections is that it doesn’t appear that the populace of
those jurisdictions have extreme preferences. And so it
becomes possible to test whether a politician is able to
impose his views in favor of either smaller or bigger govern-
ment. It turned out that it didn’t matter whether a
Republican or a Democrat won a close election. They do
basically the same thing. 
This, in my view, is basically a validation of Anthony
Downs’ median voter theory. At the local level — perhaps
not at the federal or state level — what really matters are the
preferences of the median voter. It’s not the preferences of
the politicians who get elected. The politicians are driven by
the competitive forces of their environment to do what the
median voter wants. Mobility is so high and there are so
many competitive districts within a metropolitan area
where people can move to, that the politicians must respond
to the median voter’s wishes. A politician might be ideolog-
ical but he can’t act on it. 
To give you an example, in Swarthmore there are a bunch
of single-family homes owned by relatively high-income
people who are willing to tax them-
selves a lot to get good public
schools. That’s the median voter.
Any politician who said he was 
going to cut taxes and not fund
schools would get run out of town
on a rail. He might believe that 
personally, but he would never
declare it publicly.
RF: Are there any issues that you
are working on currently which
you think are important that we
haven’t discussed?
Gyourko:  Ed Glaeser, Albert Saiz,
and I have this paper, “Housing
Supply and Housing Bubbles,” that
just came out in the Journal of Urban
Economics. Basically, it shows that in
inelastically supplied housing markets, volatility really is
higher. It’s true not just on the blackboard, it also shows up
in real-world data. Inelastically supplied housing markets
have much bigger housing booms and busts, which is a bit
foreboding right now. When fundamentals change, price
could adjust or quantity could adjust. But quantity can’t
adjust in an inelastic market. All of the adjustment from the
change in fundamentals is in prices. They can really boom in
good times and really bust in bad times. So as we think about
this housing debacle, one of the ways to at least lower
volatility in the next downturn — and there will be another
one — is to think about increasing the elasticity in these
markets. 
The other thing in that paper which I think is interesting
really goes back to work by Sherwin Rosen and Jennifer
Roback. In a free market, prices are pinned down by pro-
duction costs. And those production costs are physical
construction costs, land and land assembly costs, and entre-
preneurial profit. In that paper, we compute each of those
costs for each market. You can build an 1,800 square foot
home in any market in the United States for less than
$200,000 in today’s dollars. 
If you look prior to 2003, throughout the Sun Belt, in any
unconstrained market where you think supply elasticity is
high, actual prices never deviate by more than 10 percent. 
It appears to work really well. Then, after 2003, in Florida,
Phoenix, Las Vegas, the Inland Empire of California, prices
started to deviate considerably. That appears to be the
beginning of the real mispricing of housing. Those markets
start to look like they are inelastic in supply, but the 
number of permits never went down. As an old Chicago
School guy, it’s the closest I have ever come to saying we 
simply mispriced this asset. Theory tells us that prices
should be pinned down by the sum of those three factors,
and for 20 years they were. To me, this also suggests where 
prices are going back to in those markets.  RF
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